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Since World War II, American scientists have played significant roles
in the formulation of United States policy regarding the development
and deployment of nuclear and other technologically complex weapons.
For over a decade, scientists have sought to influence in various ways
the nuclear policies of a government sincerely committed to the
achievement of some measure of arms control or disarmament. A
decade, however, has proved to be too short a period for the emer-
gence of comfortable working relationships between the government
and the scientific community.
A recent volume-Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians by Harold
Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein*-explores the interrelationships be-
tween scientists and non-scientists in policy-formation and in inter-
national negotiation. It is a case study of the events leading up to the
1963 test ban agreement, the only major arms control pact signed to
date. A competently researched if somewhat over-documented' volume,
it reveals the influence of technical analyses over policy during the seven
years of Soviet-American negotiations. The record demonstrates that
the United States consistently turned to "science" to avoid making or
revealing difficult policy decisions. In fact, scientists were injected into
the negotiations because of a political gambit, before the United States
committed itself to a test ban at all. Secretary Dulles needed to counter
what he considered the propaganda victory scored by the Soviet Union
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1. The book is laden with references to public records of the Geneva negotiations, and
relates the course of the talks on an almost day-by-day basis. A good deal of this could
have been summarized, and the reader referred to two U.S. Government publications
which do an entirely adequate job of setting forth the successive changes in the bargaining
positions of the various nations. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GENEVA
CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS (1961) and UNITED STATES
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL NEcOTIATIONS ON ENDING NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS (1962).
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in March, 1958, when at the end of a prolonged series of tests, and just
before an American series was scheduled to begin, it announced that
it would unilaterally cease testing if other nations did likewise. Dulles
himself drafted a letter which President Eisenhower sent to Chairman
Khrushchev, proposing that technical experts from both sides meet to
discuss control measures for a test ban; this was designed to seem like a
new initiative without committing the United States to a substantive
diplomatic position. Dulles thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union
would agree to the proposal; it was "a limited risk which he was willing
to accept."
'2
In fact, the Russians did agree, and the scientists met. At the Con-
ference of Experts it became clear first, that the difficult question in the
years to come would be that of the detection of underground testing,
and second, that no feasible inspection system could guarantee the
detection of every test. Some element of risk would remain. Tests of
weapons of less than a certain threshold of explosive power might re-
main hidden; the size of the threshold would depend on the extent of
the control network. In retrospect it became easy to separate the prob-
lem into a technical component (what size of test will this system detect,
with what probability) and a political one (how much risk is this nation
willing to accept, given the extrinsic goals of reversing the arms race,
ending fallout, etc.). These components remained muddled for a long
time. The United States wished to put off decisions about acceptable
risk as long as possible, and that desire was compounded in this case
because any decision would have to be made on the basis of countless
uncertainties (e.g., the weapons that might be developed of which no
one had any inkling, the possibility that a nation could devise a method
of clandestine testing that would evade the control system altogether,
and the fact that all of the discussions of detection had been conducted
on the basis of data from a single underground test). And the American
scientists were aware that a joint technical report which merely de-
scribed a given control system would have important political reper-
cussions.
Before the Conference of Experts, scientists urged Washington to
decide on an acceptable threshold, but "this issue was dropped into the
lap of the American delegation in Geneva."' At the Conference the
Russians recommended one control system (implicitly tied to a particu-
lar threshold) and the Americans another. The British suggested a
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gation "tried desperately to obtain a judgment from Washington as to
whether or not the [British] control system... would present an accept-
able risk to the United States, but he could not obtain this assurance."
4
Nevertheless, the scientists of all three nations recommended to their
governments a single system similar to that suggested by the British.
After the Experts' Conference adjourned, a "political" Conference
was convened. During its first recess, the United States discovered new
scientific data demonstrating that the scientists had been insufficiently
cautious in extrapolating detection data from the results of one ex-
plosion. The "new data" was rushed to the Conference in raw form; no
attempt was made to propose specific modifications in the recommended
control system. Washington continued to think of the problem as a
purely technical one. There had never been reached a decision on
threshold which could serve as the basis for demanding an upgrading in
the control system. The Soviets, many neutrals, and many Americans as
well saw the presentation of the new data, without a counter-proposal,
as an obvious attempt to torpedo the Experts' recommendations without
providing any alternative basis for discussions.
As the American scientists became more aware than ever of their role
as policy-makers-by-default, the absence of political instructions had
another effect. The Americans knew that, in general, the U.S. could not
accept a treaty based largely on "trust," although to some extent, be-
cause of the uncertainties, any treaty would have to contain some ele-
ment of trust. Given no word about acceptable risk, the scientists
advising the political conference pushed for "minimum" risk, whatever
that was. This led to ridiculous proposals, requiring more and more
detection equipment. For instance, the American scientists argued "the
need for a system of satellites in orbit around the sun, so that there
would be no blind spots behind the sun or the moon" in which the
Russians could test.5 Of course such a secret operation was possible, and
the scientists had no basis by which to discount it as improbable.
Unlike its predecessor, the Kennedy Administration, which actively
sought a test ban, was able to distinguish between the political and the
technical aspects of the detection problem, but it relied on the wealth
of technical data to obscure its political decisions. It perpetuated the
myth that U.S. policy was dictated by the state of the art of seismology;
changes in policy were rationalized in terms of new scientific discover-
ies. A strong reason for the administration's willingness to make con-





eliminating fallout and of stabilizing the arms race, coupled with a
reluctance to run for re-election on the test-ban issue. The President
believed that if he could not negotiate a treaty by the summer of 1963,
it would have to wait until 1965.
The abandonment of a threshold (below which tests would be
allowed) was occasioned by the fact that it would be too difficult to
police (i.e., to tell precisely what the yield was in borderline cases), plus
a belief that the U.S.S.R. would not agree to a treaty which allowed any
testing to continue. The choice of the number eight and then seven as
the number of annual on-site inspections demanded was a result not
of any scientific formula, but was determined by a hope that the
U.S.S.R. would compromise at five, and a suspicion that the Senate
would certainly refuse to ratify a treaty allowing fewer than five inspec-
tions. The dropping of the demand for internationally supervised
control posts in the U.S.S.R. was also a measure designed to facilitate
agreement, since Soviet objections and fears of espionage had made
this an extremely difficult issue in the past.
These lines of argument were not the ones offered to Congress or to
the public to justify the U.S. position in early 1963. Treaty ratification
would be more likely if the government could rely on its scientists
rather than its willingness to trust the Russians not to spend half of
their budget hiding nuclear tests. Three devices were used to imply that
reductions in American demands were justified by the cold data.
The first was continued statements that the system suggested by the
U.S. guaranteed detection: "We have suggested that we would not
accept a test ban which did not give us every assurance that we could
detect a series of tests underground."0 The second was the constant
refrain that the new revisions in U.S. policy had been made only after
a careful review of the data: "There have been numerous reassessments
of the technical problems involved in detecting underground nuclear
explosions .... These reassessments have.., produced changes in the
U.S. position." 7 The third was the provision of generally optimistic
technical testimony. However, specific lines of logic were not drawn
between the data that was released and the policy advocated. From the
point of view of technical reasoning, there remained many gaps.
For instance, the administration still did not discuss the acceptable
threshold below which it thought weapons development would not be
significant. (Most likely the U.S. thought that low-yield tests could be
6. President Kennedy at News Conference, March 6, 1963, as reported in the Washing.
ton Post, March 7, 1963.
7. 109 CoNo. Rac. 1641 (1963) (statement of William C. Foster).
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significant; most U.S. underground tests since 1963 have been below ten
kilotons.) Nor did the U.S. declare an acceptable probability that a
detected test would not be identified as such, and therefore not ques-
tioned. It did not offer the Congress an estimate of how large a series of
tests the U.S.S.R. would need for significant testing, and therefore by
what factor the requirements for detecting and identifying a single
given test could be reduced. Nor did it ever state the percentage of
unidentified events that one would want to inspect on-site to feel
secure. Ironically, all of these questions were bypassed, because three
months after the domestic technical debate waxed most furious, the
Soviet Union accepted the standing American offer of a partial ban
which excluded from its coverage the area of testing that had occupied
the attention of scientists for over five years--underground detonations.
WHICH SCIENTSTS?
Perhaps the most fascinating topic which the authors discuss-un-
fortunately, they only touch upon it-is the question of which scientists
have a role in the formation of policy. As the authors point out, a
scientific consensus is rare. In 1958, for example, the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Disarmament asked thirty-five seismologists, geophysicists,
and geologists to discuss the issues of detection and identification.
The report contained a mass of contradictory information. Some
of the scientists replied unambiguously that underground ex-
plosions could be detected, others thought that some such explo-
sions could, while still others held that it was impossible to make
any general statement on the basis of existing knowledge. There
was no agreement concerning the size of signals produced by
explosions of various yields.
8
Obviously, it is important that the President and his political ad-
visors be exposed to the widest possible variety of scientific viewpoints,
even if this puts them into the difficult position of having to be suffi-
ciently informed on technical matters that it is possible to make an
informed guess about which scientist is right. Whether our current
machinery suffices to provide this maximum exposure is doubtful. On
technical matters relating to test ban policy, the President was advised
by his Scientific Advisor, plus, over time, a series of five specially chosen
ad hoc committees of scientists. In addition, two sets of scientists com-
posed the American delegations to the Conference of Experts and
Technical Working Group II, which dealt with underground testing.




many scientists, and to enable new points of view to emerge. It is only
natural, however, when convening a panel of experts from an unfamiliar
field, to choose those who have proved their expertise by prior work
of a similar nature. Comparison of the authors' footnote listings of
scientific advisors reveals that when the new Kennedy Administration
convened scientists to take a fresh look at the technical aspects of the
negotiations, eleven of the thirteen chosen scientists had been members
of at least one of the five previous panels and delegations. The authors
believe that the President's Scientific Advisory Committee can ade-
quately present divergent viewpoints if it develops adequate techniques
for transmitting them to the White House.0 Since the Committee will
contain, at any one time, a maximum of three or four specialists in
a particular field, and perhaps fewer in as specialized a field as seismol-
ogy or geophysics, the authors' conclusion can be regarded as correct
only if the Committee also works out methods of actively seeking out
points of view which are at odds with those of its resident experts
within the particular area at issue.
A problem related to who gives advice is who performs the research,
at the very lowest and most basic level. Nearly all of the American re-
search on detection of underground tests-perhaps all that was taken
seriously-was performed under the auspices of project Vela Uniform.
This detection program was modeled on the armament research pro-
gram: the Defense Department was given $50 million annually to
contract out to individuals and corporations to perform specified re-
search tasks. Thus the Defense Department chose the scientists who
might make discoveries significant for disarmament, guided their work,
and made the crucial decisions as to which scientists' work merited
further research or presentation to policy makers. As a consequence,
"[a]n overwhelming number of the scientists who have been involved
in the formulation of American security policy [from the points of view
both of arming and of disarming] thus far have been employed by the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense,"10 which
presents a certain danger because, as the authors understate it, "the
views of most individuals are affected more or less strongly by the
milieu in which they work."'"
The dangers inherent in Defense Department bureaucratization and
monopolization of disarmament research are best illustrated by two
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and failed so badly that they are not even mentioned in the volume
under review.
12
THE CASE OF L. DON LEET
Professor L. Don Leet, a scientist not employed by the Vela research
project, criticized both the organization of that project and the fact that
American policy was being made more rigid than the state of the art
of seismology, in his opinion, required. Leet's motives were not politi-
cal. A Republican all his life, Leet had never joined any political
organizations and had no strong feelings one way or the other about
accommodation with the Soviet Union. Even with regard to the test
ban, he was politically naive; he vaguely realized that what he was doing
had important political implications, but that had no effect whatsoever
on his behavior. His struggle was a professional one; it did not have
hidden political overtones.
L. Don Leet is one of the elder statesmen of American seismology.
Born in 1901, he was the third recipient of the Ph.D. in seismology in
the United States. In 1930, he was appointed to teach geology at
Harvard (where he had received his graduate education), and to run the
Harvard seismograph station, one of the first such stations in the
country. He has taught seismology at Harvard for thirty-six years, and
has written eight books and thirty-five articles. He happened to choose
as his special field of study the measurement and interpretation of
waves from underground dynamite explosions, and for this purpose, he
designed the tri-directional Leet seismograph. When the first atomic
bomb was exploded at Alamagordo, Leet was the man called to measure
the seismic waves.
Leet was not aware that the U.S. was about to establish a seismic
research program until the Vela program was actually set up in 1959.
Considering his specialty in blast seismology, he was surprised that he
had not been contacted earlier. In January, 1960, he submitted a con-
tract proposal. He sought $154,300.00 to
a) Develop and test equipment for continuous tape registration of
earth waves on an open time scale .... b) Operate this equipment;
investigate results of different types of analysis; develop criteria
for distinguishing explosion waves from earthquake waves ....
Attention would be directed first to the effect of these presentations
on sharpness of first motion and other phases from both earth-
12. Matters of fact concerning the two scientists which are not otherwise documented
were discovered in a series of interviews with both scientists and corroborated to whatever
degree possible by my investigations. It is of course possible that neither the scientists nor
the author had perfect information about the events which transpired.
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quakes and blasts; also, to the distribution of energy among the
various phases, and the ratio of energy in S to energy in P for
earthquakes contrasted to explosions.1 3
Leet felt that since he had been looking at records of both explosions
and earthquakes for thirty years, he would be more likely to spot signi-
ficant differences in them than practically anyone else. All through
1960 he waited for an answer from the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), which administered Vela Uniform. Finally in Decem-
ber of that year, eleven months after he had submited his proposal, he
received a six-sentence summary notice of rejection.14
Leet was disappointed by his rejection, and curious about its cause.
During 1961, he tried to find out why he had been turned down, but was
unsuccessful. Meanwhile, he applied to the U.S. Coast and Geodetic
Survey for a contract to equip the Harvard Seismograph Station with
"standard instrumentation"; the agency was awarding such equipment
to over a hundred stations as part of the Vela program. Harvard was
again rejected; nearby Weston Observatory was chosen instead.
In January, 1962, Leet decided to re-open the question. He recalled
having answered the questionnaire on test detection that had been
sent to him in 1958 by Senator Humphrey, and now he called
Humphrey's office. On January 31, an interview was arranged between
Leet and Adrian Fisher, deputy Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency. They discussed the test detection problem for an
hour and a half. Finally Leet was asked, "if your theories prove correct,
does it mean that we'll need more or less inspection in the Soviet
Union?" Leet answered, "Less." He was told that the Agency would
be in touch with him soon. But he was never called.15
13. L. Don Leet, Proposal for Seismological Research Project, submitted to the Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) on January 22, 1960. P waves and S waves are
respectively the first and second types of waves which reach scismometers after a seismic
event. L (long) waves are the third and last type to arrive after travelling through por-
tions of the earth.
14. Your unsolicited proposal entitled "Proposal for Seismological Research Project,"
which was submitted to the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) on
January 28, 1960, has recently been carefully reviewed jointly by this office and
AFTAC. This proposal was considered for possible support as a research effort under
the current VELA UNIFORM Program. Unfortunately, we do not find it possible to
support the above proposal at the present time. Your interest in Project VELX, as
shown by your effort in preparing the subject proposal, is greatly appreciated. We
regret that action on this proposal has been deferred during the past several months.
We will continue to consider the capabilities of your organization with regard to
possible future participation in certain aspects of the nuclear test detection project.
Letter to Leet from G. Al. Beyer, ARPA, December 27, 1960.
15. Gardner, L. Don Leet, Harvard Crimson, March 24, 1962, p. 2, col. I. Confirmed
by Dr. Leet in October, 1963.
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In Feburary, Leet arranged an interview with Gerald Johnson,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. Johnson introduced
Leet to George Bing, who was in charge of Vela contracts. Leet asked
why his proposal had been rejected. Before he received an answer,
Johnson left the interview to meet some visitors from Europe. Bing
said he would look up the record in his files.
In early March, Leet heard from Bing. Bing said:
After careful review of this proposal in conjunction with several
other government agencies, ARPA decided that it was supporting
as much development work in the field of seismic tape recording
at that time as proper program balance and funding allocations
would allow.16
After two trips to Washington and two years of frustration trying
to go through the official channels, Leet felt that this letter was the
final blow. He felt that he had been insulted; his personal experience
and reputation had been ignored, and his proposal had been interpreted
solely as a request for money for instrumentation. Leet sent Bing a long
and angry letter, complaining that his proposal had been misinterpreted
as "just another tape recorder" and pointing out that even if that were
what he'd proposed, the Vela project had awarded many such grants
subsequent to receipt of his contract proposal.'1 The reply was again a
16. Letter of March 5, 1962.
17. ... The implication that in effect my proposal was primarily one in instrumenta-
tion, just another tape recorder, misses the point by a wide margin. ... The central
point was to get information from the ground in a form that I personally, from a
background of 30 years with 50,000 earthquake records and studies of blast records
from seismic prospecting types to the first atomic bomb (a combination unique In this
country), felt would [enable us to develop identification criteria]. . . . [You say you
could not afford to support any more work in seismic tape recording. And yet
according to the Contract Compendium, you awarded a contract on] April 1, 1960,
for $418,064; principal investigator, Dr. Walter Munk, an oceanographer and member
of the Berkner Panel; task statement included "Conduct a statistical study and
analysis of seismic records; establish and operate an array of 3.component long-
period seismographs; provide for centralized digital-recording on magnetic tape of
data ......
Then under date of May 19, 1960, for $395,193, 4 months after my application;
principal investigators, Dr. Frank Press and R. Hugo Benioff, members of the
Berkner Panel; including "Develop a digital seismograph system for recording data
in a form compatible with computer methods .. "
And under date of June 1, 1961, for $292,130, a year and a half after my application
and 6 months after my rejection . . . ; principal investigator was Dr. Maurice Ewing,
member of the Berkner Panel and recipient of grants totalling $1,064,720 up to
August, 1961; task, "establish a five-station seismograph network for the magnetic.
tape recording of seismic signals .. "
We only asked to build one instrument to explore the needs of the problem. We
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summary rejection, and made no reference either to the points Leet
raised or to his request for information. 8
Even before he received Bing's answer, Leet had come to the end of
his patience. He used the forum of his undergraduate lecture course to
tell the story of his dealings with Washington. Soon after, he was
visited by a reporter from the student newspaper, the Crimson, and he
agreed to grant an interview. Leet voiced all of the suspicions he had
been holding back, and when the story broke, copies found their way
into Washington and Moscow.
Aside from his personal frustration, Leet had two great complaints.
First, he explained that seismologists fall into two broad groups---earth-
quake seismologists (who had spent years looking at waves from earth-
quakes, and, in a few very rare cases, large explosions), and "doodle-
buggers," seismologists who had received practically all of their training
in prospecting seismology. According to Leet, the five seismologists on
the 14-man Berkner Panel (which recommended the establishment of
Vela, and outlined the general directions that research would follow),
were all essentially "doodlebuggers." In seeking to discriminate be-
tween bombs and earthquakes they concentrated on the direction of
the ground motion of the first signal received when any earthquake
station seismologist could have told them that that criterion was un-
workable, due to the high noise level. But earthquake seismologists
such as the Jesuits (who operate seismograph stations all over the
country), representatives of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and inde-
pendent seismologists with long experience (like himself) were "ex-
cluded."
"Not using earthquake station seismologists on a project like this,"
he explains, "is like revising our measurement system without con-
weren't and aren't interested in the instrument manufacturing business by govern-
ment subsidy or any other means....
I would like to avail myself of ARPA's expressed interest in suppl)ing some of the
"new seismic data being generated by the Vela Uniform program." But to be in a
position to specify the goals of an investigation in the detail you explained is
necessary, I would need to know exactly what kinds of data are available in what
form. Can I get this information from one or more of the Vela Uniform contractors
named above, or any others?
Letter of March 10, 1962.
18. Following receipt of your lengthy letter of March 10th, I felt obliged to once
more review your proposal of January, 1960. It is my opinion that the original dei-
sion not to support your proposal was sound. We have indicated to you on several
occasions our willingness to consider the technical merit of any new ideas in test
detection you may wish to propose. I can assure you that any such ideas will be
given serious review and consideration.
Letter from George Bing to L. Don Leet, April 16, 1962.
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sulting the Bureau of Standards." Others on the committee in-
cluded representatives of instrument manufacturing companies,
and one man who, according to Leet, "never took the equivalent
of Nat. Sci. 10." [a basic undergraduate geology course]19
Leet's other complaint was that of the $24 million awarded in Vela
contracts up to August, 1961, two-thirds or $16 million went to mem-
bers of the Berkner Panel, which had brought Vela into being, or to
the companies represented by those members. Only two members of
the Panel-Berkner and Hans Bethe-did not receive any contracts.
The Crimson erroneously reported that the contract awards were is-
sued by the Berkner Panel itself.
Two weeks after the Crimson article, Leet himself wrote an article in
a Harvard magazine known as Cambridge 38. Leet elaborated on the
charges he had made, and on his criticism of the whole system of con-
tractual research.
2 0
Then, on May 24, 1962, Leet spoke at a public meeting organized
by Scientists for Social Responsibility in Science (of which Leet was
not a member). At the meeting, Leet was asked if he felt that the seismic
research project was a conspiracy or a boondoggle. He explained that
he hoped he had not given the impression that there was a conscious
conspiracy to make profits and suppress knowledge. In geology, he
explained, as in any scientific field in America today, there are informal
"clubs" of scientists and administrators. These men know each other
professionally and in many cases, socially-they study together, write
papers together, work together. The Berkner Panel, he felt, was one
of these clubs. Once a few members have been appointed, they are
19. Gardner, supra note 15.
20. The Panel consisted of a nuclear physicist, five doodlebuggers, an oceanographer,
four instrument designers, and two employees of instrument manufacturers . .. none
of them had any experience in the parent science of earthquake seismology ....
As far as I know, Press, Ewing, and Oliver are the only members of the panel who
have done any significant work on earthquake records, and they started only a few
years ago. They made a sort of special hobby out of surface, of L, waves, but un-
fortunately, it has turned out from the very few available records of nuclear tests
that, at a distance, surface waves are apparently notable by their absence . . . There
are a dozen working seismologists in this country who aren't known in the headlines,
but .. . they've read records by the thousands ...
The way to solve problems like test detection is simple and has been known and
used for generations. You make a thorough canvass of existing knowledge before you
begin. You ask everybody who has been working in the area, "What have you done,
what do you suggest?" You don't classify; you let what you are doing and thinking
be known-if you are doing and thinking foolish things, people will tell you so ...
secrecy is not at all necessary since the data on test detection is being accumulated
for the express purpose of showing it to the Russians.
Leet, Nuclear Test Detection, Cambridge 38, April, 1962, pp. 9-10.
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likely to be asked, "Who else would be a good choice?", and they are
likely to name the colleagues whom they know best, their contempo-
raries. In this case, the younger generation was called, and the men
who had started the field thirty years before were excluded, more by
oversight than by malice. When it came to deciding who could best
use the money, the names of the members of the Berkner Panel were
the ones that were familiar to the contract officers, and they were in-
vited to submit proposals.21
Whether he had meant it or not, Leet's articles certainly had sug-
gested a conspiracy. And they attracted publicity. The Boston Traveler
ran a front-page picture story on Leet. The New Republic discussed his
case. Left-wing periodicals such as the National Guardian gave him
coverage. Even Isvestia printed a badly distorted version of Leet's
charges.
As it turned out, not all of Leet's criticisms had been adequately
researched or judiciously phrased. It is not clear whether or not he had
thought, in March, that the Berkner Panel awarded the contracts; he
claims the undergraduate newspaper misquoted him, but at one point
he stated that he "stood behind" the story. He had stated, in both
articles, that the Berkner Panel "insisted that the U.S. raise its de-
mands"; he was wrong, in that the Panel never suggested policy, but
only tried to describe the state of the art and the need for research.
Furthermore, it was an exaggeration to refer to Drs. Press, Ewing,
Oliver, Romney and Benioff as "doodle-buggers." Press and Ewing,
for example, directed seismology at Cal. Tech. and Columbia, though
they had not been in the field anywhere near the time Leet had.
Leet was criticized for his exaggerations by Dr. Norman Haskell, a
branch chief at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, which
was working on a large Vela contract. Haskell challenged Leet's state-
ment that "most of the people in the panel wouldn't even know the
names of two or three real seismologists," pointing out that there were
five seismologists on the Panel. He deprecated Leet's concern for the
omission of the Jesuits, pointing out that the Jesuits didn't seem con-
cerned about it. He argued that it was the Russians, not the Americans,
who had insisted that the "first [earth] motion" criterion was a good
one.
2 2
Despite some excesses, such as refusing to recognize the seismologists
on the Panel as "real seismologists," much of Leet's complaint was
probably legitimate. The joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. report of the 1958 Con-
21. Speech at Peabody Museum, Hanard University, May 24, 1962.
22. Letter to Leet, June 7, 1962.
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ference of Experts had been quite optimistic about the first motion
criterion.m And Professor Hans Bethe, a member of the Berkner Panel,
had said in 1960, "The best distinguishing mark that seismologists have
been able to find is the direction of the so-called first motion-whether
the first wiggle starts up or down." 24 The Berkner Panel's lack of per-
sonnel who could have made expert judgments on first motion is
particularly striking because the Panel's predecessor, the Bethe Panel,
had had the same defect, and (unbeknownst to Leet) had been criti-
cized for it.
25
There is a possibility, also, that Leet's criticism of Press, Ewing, et al.,
had some degree of validity. It is hard to believe that they lack the
qualifications to be called "real seismologists," but perhaps their per-
sonal experience with records was less than optimal. According to
Leet, "They haven't looked at enough records. They're big shots; they
have other people look at records, and they run organizations that are
equipped and manned with people able to read records."
Something is also to be said for Leet's insistence that the Jesuits
and/or the Coast and Geodetic Survey should have been represented
on the Panel, rather than simply Vela contractors. The roles played
by those carrying out a research contract are different from those
played by the people who draw up the directions for research.
Finally, it is remarkable that the nation's greatest authority on seis-
mic waves from large explosions, the man who was in charge of seismol-
ogy at Harvard, the man who was called to measure the seismic waves of
the Alamagordo test, the only seismologist called by the Joint Commit-
tee before the underground GNOME explosion of 1961 to testify on
the possible damage that that explosion might cause, was not consulted
before either the organization of the Berkner Panel or the Vela Project,
and was rebuffed when he applied to join the program.
23. The majority of earthquakes can be distinguished from explosions with a high
degree of reliability if the direction of first motion of the longitudinal wave is clearly
recorded at 5 or more seismic stations on various hearings from the epicenter. Thus
not less than 90% of all earthquakes taking place in continents can be identified. The
remaining 10% or less of cases will require the analysis of additional seismograms
where this is possible; and for this purpose use must also be made of the data of the
existing network of seismic stations. If required, these supplementary stations should
be further equipped with improved apparatus.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 1, at 297.
24. Bethe, The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests, 206 Atlantic Monthly, August, 1960,
p. 44.
25. See testimony of F. G. Blake in Hearings on Oceanography 1961-Phase Three,




Meanwhile, Leet was no longer very concerned with the past. Sinc
early 1962, he had been working on his own, restudying earthquak,
records and comparing them to the six (pre-1959) underground ex.
plosions whose traces were generally available and not classified. By
May, he thought that he had found an answer-a criterion which could
discriminate between bombs and earthquakes. It was valid for all of
the bomb tests he had looked at; he wanted it to be applied to the
records of the more recent tests which were classified and unavailable to
persons not working on the Vela project. -0 The editors of Scientific
American took an immediate interest in Leet's criterion; an article
was quickly drafted and rushed to New York. It appeared as the lead
article in the June, 1962, issue.27
Leet proposed the following test: when an event has occurred, first
examine the records from stations nearest to the epicenter, the point
on the earth's surface nearest the event. Measure the ratio of the total
energy in the P-waves (the first type received) to the total energy in the
S-waves (the next type) on records taken at progressively greater dis-
tances from the epicenter. In earthquakes, P dies out first, and the ratio
of S over P increases with distance. Then S dies out, and at great dis-
tances, only the L waves (the last type received at any given station)
remain. They are very small at those great distances, but they are
clearly L waves. With explosions, however, L dies out first, then S, and
finally P. The distinguishing marks of bomb tests are an S over P
ratio which decreases with distance, and a "lonesome P wave" at sta-
tions far from the epicenter. The "lonesome P wave" may be too small
to be noticed if it were not looked for, but the inspectors would be
tipped off to look for it by the decreasing S to P ratio in the records
from closer stations.
Whether or not records were ever examined for lonesome P is im-
possible to know. Leet was still not consulted, and records were not
sent to him for his evaluation. To Washington, Leet still represented
the irresponsible critic. The Disarmament Agency reproduced and
distributed the article that Isvestia had printed about Leet, as an ex-
26. Cf. The New York Times April 26, 1962: "University of California seismologists,
acting on orders of the Government, refused to say whether their instruments detected
today's Pacific nuclear test. 'There is a restriction on any information on seismographic
readings during these tests,' a spokesman said. 'The request was made by the Govern-
ment.' It was speculated that the order stemmed from the 'Vela' project for detecting
nuclear explosions with-among other means--seismographs, the instruments used to
record earthquakes. It is known that the University of California is engaged in seismo-
logical work for the Government."
27. Leet, The Detection of Underground Explosions, 202 Scientific American, June, 1962.
pp. 55-59.
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imple of the dangers of speaking to the press without going through
the proper channels. No public clamor resulted from the publication
of Leet's Scientific American article, though a Labour Member of the
British Parliament was quite excited about it and continued to question
the Prime Minister as to what Britain was doing about the Leet pro-
posals.
2
Finally a refutation of Leet's theory came forth, in the form of an
article by Carl Romney (the Defense Department representative on
the Berkner Panel) in the August 1, 1962 issue of Vesiac, the Vela
Project's official digest.29 Leet was not invited to submit a rebuttal, nor
was he informed of the impending publication of the article. He was
not sent a copy, nor was he informed when it had been published. (He
was sent a copy by an old friend. He had been receiving the bulletin
regularly since he had submitted a Vela proposal, but the issues stopped
coming at about the time he attacked the Berkner Panel.) The bulletin
was marked "For official use only." Rightly or wrongly, Leet did not
seek to rebut the article; he felt that if he did, he would be criticized
and perhaps punished for possessing a document which he was not
supposed to have.
The refutation by Romney was riddled with errors and misrepre-
sentations of Leet's theory. For example, it reproduced seismic records
of a few underground explosions and instructed, "Note that the largest
S waves are many times larger than the P waves." Leet was not talking
about the records from one station; he was talking about the trend in
the S to P ratio with regard to several stations at varying distances.
Furthermore, Leet was not talking about the largest waves; he was
talking about the total energy-the summation of all the waves, large
and small. In Romney's own graphs, the total energy in the P waves
exceeded that energy in the S waves.
On February 1, 1963, Leet was suddenly asked to fly to Washington to
see Jerome Wiesner, the President's Science Advisor. It is not clear
what prompted this invitation. According to Leet, Wiesner wanted to
know all about lonesome P. He seemed interested and impressed, but
as far as Leet could tell, he had read neither the Scientific American
article nor the refutation. With Leet in his office, Wiesner put in a
telephone call to the Pentagon and instructed the officials there to pre-
28. The Prime Minister finally answered that Britain was in correspondence with
Leet. Leet received a letter saying that "[The Prime Minister] understands that your
ideas and data are being taken into account in the research programmes on this subject
in the United States."
29. Romney, Commentary on 'The Detection of Underground Explosions' 1I Veslac
No. 8, 1-5 (August 1, 1962).
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pare at once a set of records for Leet to look at. But Leet never received
any records.
The story of L. Don Leet is not so much a case of who was right and
who was wrong as it is a case of the plight of a man unused to the ways
of governmental bureaucracy, who nevertheless may have had some-
thing to contribute to a problem in which that bureaucracy, at least
at its highest levels, was keenly interested. Had Leet been adept at
dealing with governmental or other "inner circles," he could certainly
have been successful in representing his theories and perhaps even his
criticisms in a more respectable light. He might have renewed contacts
with his colleagues and sought their help in getting a Vela contract,
or worked through a professional association. He might have been more
understanding of the ill-oiled wheels of the Vela bureaucracy, and more
resourceful in coping with them; he did not, for instance, take any
action between January and December of 1960 to find out what had
become of his proposal. And he might have refrained altogether from
making what were interpreted as personal attacks on the members of
the Berkner Panel. Even if his assertions were correct, they could not
possibly advance the cause of his techmical ideas and could only give
him a professional black eye.
But the story of Leet is also not a story of mere personal ineptitude.
Disarmament research is research by contract, and as innumerable de-
fense contract scandals have shown, research by contract may always
degenerate into close or interlocking connections between grantors and
grantees unless extreme precautions are taken to insure that all appli-
cants are given an equal chance to participate. The rejection letters
which Leet's proposal received suggest one aspect in which the pro-
cedure could be improved; the agency should be made to give reasons
for rejection or for a choice of one proposal over a similar one from
another applicant. Beyond that, the agencies concerned should be
aware of the problem, and should make every conceivable effort to
consider the merits of proposals even from 'lone wolf' scientists who
are not in the club, who have been engaging in some 'unfashionable'
line of research, or who have not previously shown an interest in gov-
ernment programs. Disarmament is too important a business for us to
be able to afford to lose the services of another L. Don Leet, whose
technical theories have to this day been neither proved nor disproved.
THE CAsE OF DR. SP.ETH
Unlike Professor Leet, Dr. Sheridan Dauster Speeth did not approach
the problems of the test ban as a political agnostic. Ever since his col-
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lege days, he had identified himself with liberal causes. Although never
a Communist or a Communist sympathizer, he was undoubtedly more
radical than the consensus of American opinion. He had joined a
sprinkling of liberal mass organizations such as the Committee for a
Sane Nuclear Policy, and had done four things which security officers
of the Defense Department may have particularly frowned upon: he
had been arrested, though neither booked, jailed nor convicted, in a
protest against a "take-cover" air raid drill in New York City; he had
contributed money to the Committee for Non-Violent Action, whose
members engaged in attempting to swim onto Polaris submarines when
they were launched; he had gone to Cuba after the revolution in 1960,
and after his return, he had joined a chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee and served on its executive committee (though he resigned
from both in 1961, about the time that the organization fell under
Communist control); and he had once audited a course in Marxism
given by the Communist historian, Dr. Herbert Aptheker. He was not
enrolled in the course, and the school at which it was given was not at
that time on the Attorney General's List, though it was later put on the
List.
Speeth obtained his M.A. at Harvard and his Ph.D. at Columbia, in
the field of psycho-acoustics, with additional study in physics, mathe-
matics, and electronics. He is a member of the Audio Engineering
Society, the Acoustical Society of America, the American Geophysical
Union, and the Seismological Society of America. The last two were
joined after intense study of seismology in his free time. He is also a
member of Sigma Xi (the scientific honor society), and SSRS (the or-
ganization of scientists who pledge themselves not to contribute to
weapons production).
In 1959, Speeth began to think that in his capacity as a member of
various liberal and radical organizations, he was having absolutely no
effect on the problem of terminating the cold war. He reasoned that
the test-ban was a technical problem, however, and that perhaps in his
role as a scientist, he could make some contribution to the problem.
He was working in a division of Bell Telephone Laboratories which
allowed its scientists to work on any project they wished, and he turned
his attention to the problem of discriminating bomb seismograms from
those of earthquakes. During 1960 he applied himself to a study of
seismology, and in the summer of that year he combined what he
learned with his training in psycho-acoustics.
The human ear is a very sensitive instrument, and the human ner-
vous system is an excellent machine for the discrimination of sounds.
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Speeth sent the waves from bombs and earthquakes into an IBM com-
puter, programmed so as to perform certain operations on the waves
and then increase their frequency by four hundred times, thus bringing
the waves into the range of human hearing. Tape recordings of the
time-compressed waves could then be played to human subjects. Speeth
found that after a few training sessions, in which the subjects were
positively reinforced each time they made a correct discrimination,
"listeners were successful in separating one class of events from the
other in over 90% of the cases presented to them."30 Mere visual in-
spection of the seismograms could show no identifying characteristics;
only the ear could tell the difference.
Speeth used bomb records of the 1958 HARDTACK series, but these
had a very serious drawback. The Air Force had used portable seis-
mometers, and had picked them up immediately after the bomb tests.
They had not left them in place long enough to record any West Coast
earthquakes. Nor had the Air Force ever taken seismometers back to
record such earthquakes. Thus although Speeth used bombs and earth-
quakes recorded over the same distances and of comparable magnitudes,
he did not have "matched pairs" which were recorded over precisely
the same path of travel through the ground.
Nevertheless, Speeth was quite excited about his results. He wrote
up his report, and immediately applied to Bell for a release for publi-
cation. A new set of negotiations were about to begin in Geneva; he
wanted very much to discuss his results with Hans Bethe, who was to
be a participant. Just before the negotiations were to begin, Speeth
asked his department head for permission to discuss the work with
Bethe that weekend. Speeth was told that he could not do that, for,
even though he had not used classified information, his paper had been
classified, and he would have to obtain a release. "How long will that
take?" he asked. "Just apply for it," he was told. He did.
Time passed. Eventually, Speeth was called into the office of Bell's
Vice President, John Tukey (a member of the Berkner Panel), who
suggested to Speeth that he rewrite his article, replacing the word
"bomb" wherever it occurred with the word "explosion," and omitting
an entire section entitled "Suggestion for a detection system" which
discussed the implications of the research for a test-ban monitoring
system. Tukey revealed that Carl Romney (the Air Force's seismologist
on the Berkner Panel) had been called in to review the paper, though
Speeth was not told if it was Romney who insisted on the alterations.
Speeth rewrote the paper, and it was again returned to him. He re-
30. Speeth, Seismometer Sounds, 33 J. Acous-ncAL Soc. Am. 909. 913 (1961).
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wrote it once more, and once more it was rejected. Meanwhile, he had
given his secretary a copy of one of the rewrites, and had instructed her
to make several photocopies and to draw up covering letters to the
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, and to various liberal
scientists around the country, such as Linus Pauling and Harrison
Brown. Thus the moment that clearance came through, the report
could be dropped into the mail and circulated. According to Speeth,
his secretary received a release from the patents division of Bell in late
December, 1960, and, mistaking it for a release for publication, she
mailed out several copies of the paper, including a copy to the Journal.
The officials at Bell soon discovered what had happened. Speeth was
told not to send out any more copies. His superior called the Journal
and requested the editor to return the article. Speeth was told that the
article was "politically loaded," and that he would have to be more
careful.
Speeth rewrote the article a third time. Still publication was denied.
On January 15, 1961, Speeth sent to his superior an angry letter of
resignation. He stated
After more carefully reading the changes suggested for my paper I
have made the following decisions: I do not want to rewrite
Seismometer Sounds. Nor since it has finally reached a few re-
sponsible scientists, do I even insist that it be further distributed in
its present form.
Three days later, the reply read, "Come by and see me; Max and I
have a version you will want to see." Speeth and his superior now
negotiated a new version, which was promptly cleared for publication
and resubmitted to the Journal. The Journal's editor was so excited
about it that he gave it a publication priority, and it appeared as
quickly as the Journal's printing lag would allow (i.e., the July issue).
Meanwhile, Charles Bates, chief of Vela Uniform, wrote to Speeth on
March 17 and asked him for six copies of his report. This was not sur-
prising, since some of the pre-publication copies had gone to Vela con-
tractors (e.g., Frank Press).
On July 25, 1961, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy began its hearings on Project Vela. That same morning, the
Washington Post had carried an Associated Press story which sum-
marized the Journal article, and discussed its implications for a test-
ban.31 During the hearings, Representative Melvin Price of Illinois
asked Richard Latter to discuss Speeth's results. Latter was a theoretical
31. Speeth had not issued a press release or otherwise sought additional publicity.
[Vol. 75:1340
TEST BAN
physicist with no experience in psycho-acoustics. He had visited Bell
Laboratories the previous year, but he had not talked to Speeth (the
only man at Bell working on this project). His testimony was non-com-
mital, but he indicated that the research should be pursued.32
Not satisfied with Latter's answer, Price asked the same question of
Dr. Bates of ARPA. Bates also suggested that the method was worth
looking into. He commented that in the Navy, "you still use the human
ear generally in sonar for distinguishing between whether you have a
submarine or a whale." And he revealed that a similar program was
being conducted at the University of Michigan; their work had gone
on only two months, but they had been able to discriminate by ear
between a 6-ton chemical explosion and a comparable earthquake.3
Shortly after the hearings, Speeth was told that Bell had been
awarded an unsolicited Vela contract to cover his work; the contract
would apply retroactively to the summer of 1960.M4 Meanwhile, Speeth
had begun working on a device that would replace the human ear, a
formula by which a computer could discriminate between bombs and
quakes by applying the same criteria which the ear applied. But he
was at a great disadvantage, because he lacked seismic records which
dearly recorded the earth motion. He had access to Coast and Geodetic
recordings, but the method by which those recordings were made
yielded only clear pictures of the time at which different portions of
the waves began; they did not show the waveform very well.3 5 The
Department of Defense had better records, and a military officer who
visited Bell in the fall of 1961 promised Speeth that they would be
sent to him.
While waiting for the improved records (which he hoped would in-
clude records of the underground test series which began in 1961),
Speeth continued to work on the automatic ear, doing as best he could
52. Some time ago I visited the Bell Telephone Laboratory to hear about their work
of listening ... [to bombs and quakes]. At that time the work was in a very pre-
liminary state, and I think that I would not have concluded that there was any real
scientific basis for believing that discrimination of earthquakes from explosions by
this means was possible. I think though that it is a method which must be looked at.
If we are to have any chance of a breakthrough, we have to take advantage of every
possible opportunity in our research program.
Hearings on Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear
Explosions and Relationship to Test Ban Negotiations Before the joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 24-25 (1961).
83. Id. at 69-74.
34. Cf. CALESs, COMPENDIUM OF CONTRACT INFORATION IN TiE VELA UNIFoRM Pnoc ,A
36 (1961).
35. For a photograph of such a record, see Leet, supra n. 27, at 58.
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with the records at hand. One day in the spring of 1962, he was called
into the office of his superior and told that he would not be able to get
even the lowest grade of security clearance, and therefore he would not
be able to see the improved recordings. He was also told that since he
could not see the recordings, he would not be able to make much of a
contribution, and therefore he was being taken off of the Vela Uniform
project. Speeth had once before requested Bell to put in an application
for "confidential" clearance for him, but he had been told that it was
so certain that he could not get it, that it would be a waste of money to
conduct a security review.
Speeth went to work on an innocuous project, but he continued to
work on detection in his spare time. During 1962, he accomplished two
objectives, he re-did his experiment, using matched pairs of bombs from
the 1958 series and quakes, and concluded that every subject could
learn to make the discrimination, and that some could obtain a score
of up to 74%. He also developed a formula for making the discrimina-
tion without using the human ear.36
Meanwhile, Speeth had been requested by the International Journal
of Science and Technology to write a note for them bringing his work
up to date, i.e., reporting progress since the Journal article. Speeth
wrote such a note; it was a general summary, containing no quantita-
tive results. In all, it was five paragraphs in length. On November 2,
1962, Speeth submitted it to the Advanced Research Projects Agency
for clearance.
Speeth's note was shuttled from office to office within the Pentagon.
At one point it was "lost" and Speeth had to resubmit it.37 Despite the
brevity of the article, clearance was not granted by the Directorate of
Security Review until five and a half months had elapsed. The only
major change made was the deletion of three sentences (one of which
read, "Recordings from a 'Geneva-type' station should soon be avail-
able.. ."). Due to the publication delays of the Journal, the note could
not be published until August, nine months after the paper had been
-ritten. 38
A more comprehensive review of Speeth's research was submitted as
a report to ARPA. In this paper Speeth discussed his results quantita-
tively, described the discrimination formula which had made suc-
36. Speeth, A Sound Detection Technique, Technical Report on Contract NObsr 85206,
Bell Telephone Laboratories (1962).
37. Memorandum from A. H. Sobel, Bureau of Ships, to C. C. Bates, ARPA, December
7, 1962; carbon copy to Speeth.
38. See Speeth, Test Detection, International Science and Technology, International
Journal of Science and Technology, August, 1963, p. 20.
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cessful discriminations in every case he had available, and analyzed why
the formula should be correct in every case, though humans would have
a certain percentage of errors. He also suggested that some of the human
errors were due to the poor quality of the records.30
On the weekend of March 2, 1963, just before the 1963 Joint Com-
mitee hearings opened, Speeth was requested by the Department of
Defense to fly to Washington and brief ARPA officials on his work
(despite the fact that he was not then an official ARPA investigator).
Speeth did fly down, and he spent an afternoon explaining his work to
a small group of uniformed officers.
Three days later, Representative Price asked Dr. Ruina of ARPA to
bring the Committee up-to-date on Speeth's work. Ruina testified:
We have done more work in the field. It still doesn't look like it
would be a very promising technique in itself .... I believe that
Dr. Speeth may have reported results as high as 85 to 90% of the
records were correctly identified by a trained observer. When the
experiments were done under slightly more careful conditions,
the result was between 60 and 70% identification . . . . A 60%o
number is hardly an impressive number. However there seems to
be enough to this that we are not quite ready to drop the work
and we want to explore it as far as we can .... It is not the sort of
thing that is capable of very extensive work. There are a few re-
searchers working at the University of Michigan and a few working
at the Bell Telephone Laboratories independently. They are now
going to get a lot more data to work with, a lot more records, and
try to handle the records in an identical way so there is no built-in
bias in the experiment and then try it again.40
Later in the hearing, Dr. John DeNoyer of the Institute for Defense
Analysis said
The most recent work by this method indicates that events can be
identified correctly about 647 of the time. This is better than half
correct answers and as such it should be encouraging .... This
method does contain a hidden danger. Seismograms from explosion
sources were called earthquakes about as often as seismograms from
earthquakes were called explosions. Any diagnostic aid must be
viewed with caution that classifies an explosion as an earthquake.
We do not have a method of training people in auditory recogni-
tion. Possibly with better methods of training the technique might
improve, but this is pure speculation. 41
39. See Speeth, supra note 36.
40. Hearings on Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying
Nuclear Weapons Tests Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 82-83 I93).
41. Id. at 220-21.
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Speeth did not see the testimony until the hearings were published in
late May. When he read them, he was shocked and angered by what he
believed to be deliberate distortions of his experiment. He deduced
that the government scientists had attributed to his experimental design
(with filtering, a sophisticated system for training the subjects and a
mathematical formula for discrimination) the less impressive results
obtained by other experimenters using a different experimental design
at Michigan. 42 He also was astonished to read in the testimony that
Vela was supporting "a few" researchers at Bell when in fact the only
researcher-himself-had been taken off the project. As for the pledge
that "they would get a lot more records," he had not received any in
the two months since the hearings (and he never did).
Whether or not the case of Dr. Speeth is atypical of the Vela research
program, it raises serious questions. Speeth was not merely a scientist
working on test detection; he was a researcher who had actually made
a discovery- in his eyes, a discovery with important implications for
the U. S. detection effort. Yet he was not encouraged by his superiors,
nor given much attention by the superiors of his superiors, nor taken
seriously by the men at the very top of Vela Uniform. At every stage,
his work was treated not as an exciting discovery which should be
widely publicized, even if imperfect, so that it could be improved upon
by the scientists of all nations; rather it was treated either as political
dynamite to be heavily shielded or as rather routine research to be
perfected and then sent to the proper authorities with the appropriate
serial number and classification. True, scientists at Michigan were en-
couraged to work along the lines which he had pioneered. That devel-
opment, however, by no means compensated for the removal of Speeth
from the Vela project. The Michigan research was not done as Speeth
would have done it. 43 It duplicated the research he had already per-
formed, and arrived at essentially the same encouraging results, while
three valuable years were lost. Had Speeth been working, he might
have carried the project a step further. And by choosing researchers
42. Frantti and Levereault, Auditory Discrimination of Seismic Signals from Earth-
quakes and Explosions, 55 BuLL. Smns. Soc. AM. 1 (1965). The Michigan investigators did
use the data from the new series of explosions. The main area of difference in experimental
design seems to have been in the training of the subjects to make successful discriminations.
Speeth had studied with Professor B. F. Skinner at Harvard and employed Skinner's
techniques of positive reinforcement in training his subjects. Frantti and Levercault
appear to have overlooked this possibility. Speeth's best subjects consistently scored 74%
(compared to a random rate of 50%), while the best listeners at Michigan scored 68%.
Training could account for this small difference.
43. See note 42 supra.
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other than Speeth the project lost whatever product results from the
enthusiasm, indeed, the fanatic effort, of a scientist who really believes
in his work.
Why should data pertinent to disarmament be classified? Even if
Speeth were a security risk, why should he not have received the seismic
records he sought? Assuming that the United States' position-that it
is willing to lower its political demands to conform with technological
advances in detection-is an honest one, there seems to be no valid
reason to prevent even the Russians or the Chinese from receiving
whatever detection data the United States has available.
Most likely, classification in disarmament has resulted from the fact
that the research program has been placed in the Defense Department,
and natural organizational tendencies in that Department lead to
excessive security.44 Possibly the taboos of security result also from
well-intentioned political motivations-the Administration may fear
that the Senate would not ratify a treaty which is to be policed in
part by a discovery of a man who had been an officer of a Fair Play for
Cuba Committee. It seems entirely possible that Frantti was put to
work re-doing the experiment, and Speeth taken off his project, so that
if anything did develop from the auditory discrimination method, it
could be billed as a discovery by Frantti.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the price paid is much too high. I
know of several persons who have gone to work for agencies of the
government concerned with disarmament not because they are indiffer-
ently seeking employment, but because they wished to make a real
contribution towards ending the nuclear arms race. It is not unlikely
that persons of this sort will have actively engaged in liberal political
causes, or been members of organizations seeking greater accommoda-
tion with the Soviet Union and China. Many of them can nevertheless
be of substantial value in their technical capacities. Barring a bona fide
government need for restriction of information, it is unwise to prevent
any scientist (or economist or sociologist) from working in this field
because of his past political background. As Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson have recognized, arms control and disarmament deserve top
priorities. From the history of American policy formation during the
test ban negotiations, politicians can learn to use more effectively the
scientific resources at hand.
44. "Everyone dealing with security affairs has an overwhelming motive to play it
safe, to run no personal risks, and to give each item a high enough security dassifiition
so that he can never be criticized by his political superiors." Do%' K. PRcIC, GoMLNMF-_r,
AN Scmrwa 43 (1954).
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